Big Trouble in Little China 2 Once China's real strategic imperative -- securing its energy and trade routes -- are grasped its activiti...
Big Trouble in Little China 2
Once China's real strategic imperative -- securing its energy and trade
routes -- are grasped its activities are more easily interpreted. Increases in
China's amphibious capabilities are usually seen as menacing Taiwan. But here's
what the Navy
League has to say:
The PLAN's evolving strategy has been described in terms of two distinct
phases. The strategy's first phase is for the PLAN to develop a "green
water active defense strategy" capability. This "green water"
generally is described as being encompassed within an arc swung from
Vladivostok to the north, to the Strait of Malacca to the south, and out to
the "first island chain" (Aleutians, Kuriles, Ryukyus, Taiwan,
Philippines, and Greater Sunda islands) to the east. Analysts have assessed
that the PLAN is likely to attain this green water capability early in the
21st century. Open-source writings also suggest that the PLAN intends to
develop a capability to operate in the "second island chain" (Bonins,
Guam, Marianas, and Palau islands) by the mid-21st century. In the future, the
PLAN also may expand its operations to bases in Myanmar, Burma. These bases
will provide the PLAN with direct access to the Strait of Malacca and the Bay
of Bengal.
These are very same island chains which so preoccupied the Imperial Japanese
Navy during the Second World War and for exactly the same reasons. Any attempts
to positively control sealanes leading in and out of northeast Asia will involve
dominating the Malay Barrier and the Bonins, Guam, Marianas, and Palau islands.
As to the amphibious force, the Navy League has this assessment:
The PLAN's 7,000-man Marine ... Force's ... primary mission is to safeguard China's island holdings in the South China Sea during times of peace and to seize and defend islands in the South China Sea during times of war.
(Here's where the Spratleys comes in. It sits across the route from the Malay
barrier to the East China Sea -- Wretchard). The Marine Force also may be
used for amphibious raids or for establishing beachheads in scenarios
entailing a military confrontation with Taiwan.
Taiwan is the secondary mission. Keeping China's access to energy is the
primary mission. The devil in the proposition is that as long as China is seen
as representing a threat to Japan, any attempts to reach out to "the first
island chain" (which includes the Aleutians) and the "second island
chain" (which includes the Bonins, which is Japanese territory) will bring
a reaction from Nippon. Like the Anglo-German Naval Race of the 1900s, any
serious maritime rivalry will be fraught will grave consequences. One
interesting thing about these developments is that for the first time in 500
years Europe is absent from the maritime strategic equation.
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