The Iraqi elections are over but who won? Randall Parker at Parapundit cites a number of sources who claim that Islamic extremism used the ...
The Iraqi elections are over but who won? Randall Parker at
Parapundit cites a number of sources who claim that Islamic extremism
used the elections to seize power.
Some continued supporters of the war in Iraq are thrilled that Americans
are in Iraq because they think America is fighting for democracy. But what
gets lost sight of is that democracy is a means to an end rather than an end
in itself. Democracy does not automatically and reliably produce the sorts of
outcomes that most Westerners envision when they think of a democratic
society. Classically liberal support for the rights of others - including
respect for the right to freedom of speech even by those critical of a
government or critical of majority beliefs - is not always a feature of
democracy everywhere in the world. The reason is simple: Lots of
people do not
believe in some of the rights that are recognized in the West and some reject
the idea of rights altogether. Take Iraq for instance. The harder core
Islamist Shiites want a more Islamic constitution now that they appear to be
headed to electoral victory.
Reuel Marc Gerecht, writing in the
href="http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/228jwcnr.asp">
Weekly Standard, takes the diametrically opposite view.
Not surprisingly, there seems to be an increasing body of
American liberals
out there who foretell the end of a "liberal Iraq" because
religious Shia now
have a political voice. It is a blessed thing that Sistani and his followers
have a far better understanding of modern Middle Eastern history than the
American and European liberals who travel to Iraq and find only fear. There
are vastly worse things in this world than seeing grown Iraqi men and women
arguing about the propriety and place of Islamic family law and traditional
female attire in Iraqi society. Understood correctly, it will be an ennobling
sight--and a cornerstone of a more liberal Iraq and the Muslim world
beyond.
Gerecht has argues that "the January 30 elections will do for
the people of
Iraq, and after them, in all likelihood, the rest of the Arab world, what the
end of the European imperial period did not: show the way to
sovereignty without
tyranny." The core of his argument comes from the appreciation
that Iraq will
develop according to its own dynamic; that it will not resume its
existence as a
kind of zombie controlled from Teheran. But he feels this can only
happen if the
Iraqis are truly left to govern themselves.
We are lucky that Iyad Allawi's moment has passed. Spiritually and
physically, Allawi would have kept the new government in the Green Zone, the
surreal, guarded compound in central Baghdad where the American embassy is
located. The United Iraqi Alliance will ensure that it is in all aspects
pulled out. No real political progress among Iraqis can be made unless the
Green Zone becomes a memory of occupation.
Then comes a zinger which, in the space of a few words, critiques of one of
the most crucial aspects of counterinsurgency policy.
The United Iraqi Alliance and the Kurdish slate will probably start to
review closely America's and Allawi's army, police, and intelligence training
programs. This is all to the good. We have had enormous problems with these
programs, in part because we have tried to incorporate Sunni Arabs who were
not loyal to the new Iraq. The Alliance and the Kurds will be much more
demanding than was Allawi, who built his outreach program to Sunnis in large
part on bribery. ... By offering them jobs in the new army, police force, and
intelligence service, Allawi led Sunnis to believe their positions in these
organizations would not be subject to democratic politics. Allawi actually
created the opposite dynamic among the Sunnis from what he intended.
The Sunni
insurgency was emboldened. Those elite Sunnis who should have felt
the need to
compromise and come on board did not do so. With the January 30
elections, the
Sunni Arabs now know the old order is dead. The Shia and the Kurds will
certainly reach out to them--Sistani has been doing so since Saddam fell--but
they are unlikely to continue any form of bribery that touches upon Iraq's
military services. Washington should welcome any change of tactics in this
direction. Allawi's way was not working.
The elections on January 30, if they mean anything, mark the
beginning of the
end of American occupation, which always in the cards. What events
will now show
is whether they also signal the end of post colonial regimes in the
middle East.
All right. Let us make an analytical bet of high probability and enormous
returns: The January 30 elections in Iraq will easily be the most
consequential event in modern Arab history since Israel's six-day defeat of
Gamal Abdel Nasser's alliance in 1967. ... Responding to the spiritual agony
and internal rot of the pan-Arab dream, Islamic activism gained speed
throughout the Middle East and has remained--outside of Iraq and now possibly
Palestine--the only serious opposition to the vagaries, incompetence, and
corruption of princely and dictatorial rule.
If Gerecht proves correct in the coming months, the American story in Iraq
will be an example of how tactical setbacks may be offset by correct strategic
judgement. The question of whether it was right to deal with Chalabi or Allawi
may in the end be dominated by the issue of whether it was right to trust the
Iraqi people to select its leader. If that judgement is correct it is possible
to be wrong in all else; if wrong nothing will avail. 1990s realpolitik let the
international system bestow recognition based on the consensus of diplomats,
academics and businessmen. The interesting thing is how many of those ostensible
leaders turned out not to be. And even though Gerecht hopes for "the health,
well-being, and influence of Grand Ayatollah Sistani" to continue, even he is
somehow drifting into the past. Things have gone beyond him. Hopefully.
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